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THOMAS F. EAGLETON: A MODEL OF INTEGRITY 
LOUIS FISHER* 
In 1975, I was invited to participate in an all-day conference held in 
Washington, D.C. to analyze Executive-Legislative conflicts.  The objective 
was to survey the meaning of the pitched battles between Congress and the 
presidency during the Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon administrations.  
Throughout the morning and afternoon we were joined by senators and 
representatives.  In an informed, thoughtful, and articulate manner they 
explained different issues, personalities, and procedures.  Senior editors and 
writers from the media sat around the room listening intently.  Occasionally I 
would watch their eyes and expressions to gauge their evaluations.  That 
evening, at the Kennedy Center, we continued the conversation over cocktails 
and dinner.  Again the editors and writers stood nearby to listen.  After I 
finished a conversation with Senator Tom Eagleton, they quickly closed in 
around me and asked, visibly shaken: “Are other members of Congress this 
bright?”  I assured them they were.  I wondered what stereotypes about 
Congress they had promoted over the years without ever getting to know their 
subject. 
Tom Eagleton had a very special capacity to combine intelligence, public 
service, and a commitment to integrity, honesty, and plain speaking.  Those 
values were in full view with the work he did on war powers.  He understood 
that core constitutional principles kept the war power with the popularly 
elected Congress.  When he saw those values violated he did what he could to 
restore the model of government fashioned by the Framers.  He watched what 
the House proposed, participated actively in Senate debates and the drafting of 
the War Powers Resolution, and reacted to what emerged from conference 
committee.  Throughout those years of debate he stood out prominently as 
someone who understood the constitutional values at stake and was willing, 
when others were not, to speak forcefully and clearly when those values were 
betrayed. 
 
* Louis Fisher is a specialist in constitutional law at the Law Library, the Library of Congress.  
He received a Bachelor of Science from the College of William and Mary and a Ph.D. in 1967 
from the New School for Social Research.  The views expressed here are personal, not 
institutional. 
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I.  HOUSE ACTION 
In 1970, the House of Representatives passed a War Powers Resolution by 
a vote of 289 to 39.1  It recognized that “the President in certain extraordinary 
and emergency circumstances has the authority to defend the United States and 
its citizens without specific prior authorization by the Congress.”2  Instead of 
trying to identify the occasions where presidents are entitled to act unilaterally, 
the House chose to rely on procedural safeguards.  The President would be 
required, “whenever feasible”, to consult with Congress before sending 
American forces into armed conflict.3  Consulting with whom, or when, was 
not specified.  The bill required the President to report the circumstances 
necessitating the action; the constitutional, legislative, and treaty provisions 
authorizing the action, “together with his reasons for not seeking specific prior 
congressional authorization”; and “the estimated scope of activities.”4  Bottom 
line: the House was willing to let the President do whatever he thought proper 
and necessary and report back afterwards.  Congressional abdication could not 
be more sweeping. 
Both houses later passed War Powers Resolutions that went beyond mere 
reporting requirements.  The House of Representatives, following its earlier 
example, did not try to define or codify presidential war powers.  It directed 
the President “in every possible instance” to consult with Congress before 
sending forces into hostile situations or when hostilities might be imminent.5  
If unable to do so, he was to report to Congress within seventy-two hours, 
setting forth the circumstances and details of his actions.6  Unless Congress 
declared war within 120 days or specifically authorized the use of force, the 
President would have to terminate the military operation and remove the 
troops.7  Congress could also vote to direct disengagement at any time during 
the 120-day period by passing a concurrent resolution.8  A concurrent 
resolution passes both houses of Congress but is not presented to the President 
 
 1. H.R.J. Res. 1355, 91st Cong. (1970), 116 CONG. REC. 37407 (1970). The House passed 
the same bill the next year under suspension of the rules (requiring two-thirds support).  H.R.J. 
Res. 1, 92d Cong., (1971), 117 CONG. REC. 28870–78 (1971). 
 2. H.R.J. Res. 1355, 116 CONG. REC. 37398 (1970). 
 3. H.R.J. Res. 1355 § 2. 
 4. H.R.J. Res. 1355 § 3. 
 5. War Powers Resolution, H.R.J. Res. 542, 93d Cong. § 3, 87 Stat. 555 (1973). 
 6. 119 CONG. REC. 24653–708 (1973). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
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for his signature or veto.9  In 1983, the Supreme Court declared this type of 
congressional control over executive actions to be unconstitutional.10 
II.  SENATE ALTERNATIVE 
Senator Eagleton regarded the House bill as deficient in protecting 
constitutional values and legislative prerogatives.  On March 1, 1971, he 
introduced legislation to require “that in virtually all cases involving the 
initiation of hostilities between United States forces and foreign military 
forces, the President would not act without prior authorization from 
Congress.”11  He believed that the Framers “were right when they decided to 
place the responsibility for going to war in the Congress.”12  Part of the 
Framers’ suspicion of executive authority came from what they saw and 
experienced during the colonial period, fostering “a deep distrust of inordinate 
executive power, as they felt that power being exercised by colonial governors 
and by the English king.”13  In reading the debates at the Philadelphia 
Convention, the Federalist Papers, and the text of Articles I and II, Eagleton 
concluded that “[g]oing to war was intended to be an orderly process in which 
deliberation would be given full play before conflict began and in which 
reason and caution would be used once hostilities had commenced.”14 
Eagleton’s resolution in 1971 recognized that “[n]o treaty previously or 
hereafter entered into by the United States shall be construed as authorizing or 
requiring the armed forces of the United States to engage in hostilities without 
further Congressional authorization.”15  This was a key provision intended to 
prevent presidents from unilaterally going to war on the basis of treaties like 
the UN Charter or NATO.  President Harry Truman went to war against North 
Korea in 1950 by seeking “authority” from the UN Security Council.16  That 
method of circumventing Congress has been used by other presidents.17  
 
 9. WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS, 332 
(7th ed., 2007) (explaining congressional procedure when the House and Senate adopt a 
concurrent resolution). 
 10. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 955–59 (1983) (holding a section of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act that authorized one house of Congress to invalidate a decision of the Executive 
Branch unconstitutional). 
 11. THOMAS F. EAGLETON, WAR AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER: A CHRONICLE OF 
CONGRESSIONAL SURRENDER 121 (1974); see also, 117 CONG. REC. 4405–07 (1971). 
 12. EAGLETON, supra note 11, at vii. 
 13. Id. at 5. 
 14. Id. at 9. 
 15. 117 CONG. REC. 4405 (1971). 
 16. LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 97–100 (2d ed., Univ. Press of Kan. 2004). 
 17. Louis Fisher, Sidestepping Congress: Presidents Acting under the UN and NATO, 47 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1237, 1237 (1997) (discussing President Truman in Korea, the first 
President Bush in Iraq, and President Clinton in Haiti and Bosnia). 
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President Bill Clinton, unable to obtain support from the Security Council for 
military operations against the Serbs in Kosovo, sought “authority” from 
NATO countries.18 
Eagleton understood, as did the Framers, the fundamental difference 
between offensive and defensive hostilities.  If the United States were attacked, 
the President could “repel the attack.”19  For any other use of force, “the 
judgment of the entire nation, acting through its elected representatives, would 
have to be sought.”20  Drawing from those principles, the Senate attempted to 
spell out the conditions under which presidents were authorized to take 
unilateral action with military force: “(1) to repel an armed attack upon the 
United States, its territories, and possessions,” to retaliate in the event of such 
an attack, and to “forestall the direct and imminent threat of such an attack”; 
(2) to repel an armed attack against U.S. armed forces located outside the 
United States, its territories, and possessions, and to “forestall the direct and 
imminent threat of such an attack”; and (3) to protect and rescue endangered 
American citizens and nationals in foreign countries or at sea.21  The first 
situation, except for the final clause, is consistent with the understanding 
developed at the Philadelphia Convention.22  The other situations reflect 
changes that have occurred in the concept of defensive war and life-and-
property actions. 
As passed in 1973, the Senate bill required the President to cease military 
action unless Congress, within thirty days, specifically authorized the President 
to continue.23  A separate provision allowed him to sustain military operations 
beyond the thirty-day limit if he determined that “unavoidable military 
necessity respecting the safety” of the armed forces required their continued 
use for the purpose of “bringing about a prompt disengagement.”24  Eagleton 
voted for the Senate bill.25  Obviously these efforts to draft legislative language 
created the risk of ambiguity and uncertainty, particularly by reference to 
“imminent” threats and “endangered” citizens. 
III.  CONFERENCE VERSION 
When the bill emerged from conference committee, it had to combine two 
entirely different legislative strategies.  The House was reluctant to draw any 
 
 18. FISHER, supra note 16, at 198–201. 
 19. EAGLETON, supra note 11, at 10; see also, FISHER, supra note 16, at 8–9. 
 20. EAGLETON, supra note 11, at 10. 
 21. S. 2956, 92d Cong. § 3, 118 CONG. REC. 12,611 (1972); S. 440, 93d Cong. § 3, 119 
CONG. REC. 25119 (1973).  For the full Senate debate in 1972 and 1973, see 118 CONG. REC. 
12577–613 (1972) and 119 CONG. REC. 25051–120 (1973). 
 22. EAGLETON, supra note 11, at 10; FISHER, supra note 16, at 8–10. 
 23. S. 440, 93d Cong. § 5; 119 CONG. REC. 25119 (1973). 
 24. S. 440 § 5. 
 25. 119 CONG. REC. 25119 (1973). 
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hard and fast lines; the Senate tried to do precisely that.  Most of the time a 
conference product can look for compromises that do no fundamental damage 
to the Constitution.  If one house votes $150 million for a program and the 
other $200 million, no harm is done in agreeing to $175 million.  For the war 
powers bill, however, the compromises produced marked incoherence and 
contradictions.  Section 2(c) provided that presidential power to engage in 
military hostilities is limited to “(1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory 
authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United 
States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.”26  Yet the bill 
authorized the President to use military force for up to ninety days anywhere, 
for any reason, without responding to an attack and without any declaration or 
authorization by Congress.27  Section 2(a) stated that the purpose of the bill 
was “to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States 
and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President 
will apply to the introduction of the United States Armed Forces into 
hostilities. . . .”28  Yet the bill clearly broke with the intent of the Framers and 
did nothing to assure collective judgment in initiating military force. 
Senators who had fought hard to reassert legislative authority over the war 
power nevertheless looked with favor upon the conference product and 
regarded it as even superior to the Senate version.  Senator J. William 
Fulbright, after recognizing Senators Eagleton and Jacob Javits as “the two 
principal Senate sponsors of this legislation,”29 called the conference bill “a 
reasonable compromise.”30  Senator Javits agreed that the bill from conference 
was “a measure of reconciliation” and “an excellent vehicle for expressing the 
congressional will perhaps better than either of the preceding bills.”31  Senator 
Edmund Muskie referred to the conference bill as “a powerful reaffirmation of 
congressional responsibility in the warmaking sphere.”32  To Senator Hubert 
Humphrey, the bill “represent[ed] one of the finest legislative 
accomplishments in [his] memory.”33 
Senator Barry Goldwater, who voted against the bill because he thought it 
infringed on presidential authority, nevertheless recognized that the conference 
version went a long way in expanding presidential power.34  He said he could 
 
 26. 119 CONG. REC. 33548 (1973). 
 27. Id. at 33555–57 (statements of Sen. Eagleton discussing the meaning of Section 4). 
 28. War Powers Resolution, H.R.J. Res. 542, 93d Cong. § 2(a), 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (The 
identical language appeared in the conference version, which became law over President Nixon’s 
veto). 
 29. 119 CONG. REC. 33548 (1973). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 33549. 
 32. Id. at 33551. 
 33. Id. at 33552. 
 34. 119 CONG. REC. 33553 (1973). 
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“probably actually vote for” the bill “because it gives the President even 
broader powers than the authors of the original bill thought they were 
correcting.”35  As rewritten in conference, “the President is no longer 
prohibited from initiating original actions.  He needs only to report during the 
first [sixty] days.”36  Eagleton immediately voiced his support for Goldwater’s 
interpretation: “The Senator is precisely correct.”37 
Eagleton refused to indulge in the euphoria and self-congratulatory 
speeches of Fulbright, Javits, Muskie, Humphrey, and others.  Instead, he 
rigorously analyzed what the Senate set out to do and compared it to what was 
done in conference.38  He pointed out that the House and Senate bills “were not 
generally compatible.  They marched down separate and distinct roads, almost 
irreconcilable roads.”39  After looking at the language in Section 2 that 
supposedly limited the President to certain conditions before ordering U.S. 
troops into hostilities, he dismissed that section (titled “Purpose and Policy”) 
as “precatory words; they are meaningless.”40  As noted above, Section 2 also 
included language about fulfilling the intent of the Framers and ensuring the 
collective judgment of both branches before introducing American forces to 
combat.41  Eagleton examined the substantive sections, such as Section 4, and 
told his colleagues that the bill authorized the President to “keep the forces 
anywhere in the world for ninety days without Congress doing a thing about 
it.”42  The bill produced by the conferees allowed “an open-ended, blank check 
for ninety days of warmaking, anywhere in the world, by the President. . . .”43  
The bill represented “a near-total abrogation of the Senate position on war 
powers.”44 
Javits challenged Eagleton’s analysis by claiming that the conference 
product “may very well be . . . a stronger statute than [what] the Senate 
passed.”45  Enactment of the bill “will make history.”46  Eagleton had no 
patience for this rhetoric.  “We are not here to make history,” he told Javits, 
“we are here to make law.”47  Comparing what the Senate had passed, after 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 33555. 
 39. 119 CONG. REC. 33555 (1973). 
 40. Id. 
 41. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 42. 119 CONG. REC. 33555 (1973). 
 43. Id. at 33556. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 33558. 
 46. Id. at 33559. 
 47. 119 CONG. REC. 33559 (1973). 
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several years of debate, to the bill that came out of conference left Eagleton 
with a feeling of repulsion: 
  Yes, I helped to give birth to the Senate bill three years ago, but the child 
has been kidnapped.  It is no longer the same child that went into the 
conference.  It has come out a different baby—and a dangerous baby, Mr. 
President.  Because this bill does not go one inch in terms of constricting the 
unilateral war-making of the President of the United States. 
  Try as he may, and able lawyer that he is, the Senator from New York 
[Javits] cannot get around the language of the statute.  He cannot get around 
the fact that the purpose and the political effect of section 2(c) is “nothing.”  
Nobel in concept but worthless in execution.48 
The Senate agreed to the conference report 75 to 20.49  Eagleton was 
among those voting “Nay.”50  The House agreed to the conference report 238 
to 123.51  Some of the House members, who had supported a war powers bill 
that would protect legislative interests, flagged the deficiencies of the 
conference product.  Elizabeth Holtzman stated that the Constitution does not 
permit the President “without congressional approval to commit U.S. forces to 
war, except in certain specific and limited circumstances, such as an 
emergency, an attack upon the United States, or an action taken in certain 
instances to protect the lives of American citizens and troops abroad.”52  Yet 
the bill authorized the President to go to war for sixty to ninety days anywhere 
in the world, for any reason, without congressional approval.53  Bella Abzug 
pledged to vote against the bill “because it is patently unconstitutional and 
gives the President power he does not now have.”54  Ron Dellums understood 
that the Senate bill had placed limits on military initiatives by the President but 
“the conference version does not even bother to try.”55  Having cleared the 
House and the Senate, the bill went to President Nixon for his signature or 
veto. 
IV.  NIXON’S VETO 
President Nixon vetoed the bill on October 24, 1973, calling it contrary to 
“the wisdom of the Founding Fathers in choosing not to draw a precise and 
detailed line of demarcation between the foreign policy powers of the two 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 33569. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 33873–74. 
 52. 119 CONG. REC. 33868 (1973). 
 53. Id. at 33870. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 33871. 
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branches.”56  The bill “would attempt to take away, by a mere legislative act, 
authorities which the President has properly exercised under the Constitution 
for almost 200 years.”57  He regarded two provisions of the bill as 
unconstitutional: the automatic cut-off of authorities after sixty or ninety days 
unless Congress extended them, and the use of a concurrent resolution to 
control the President.58  The latter, he pointed out, “does not normally have the 
force of law, since it denies the President his constitutional role in approving 
legislation.”59 
The Senate overrode Nixon’s veto by a vote of 75 to 18, far beyond the 
two-thirds required.60  Eagleton voted against the override.61  He reviewed the 
fundamental principles that should have guided members of Congress in 
drafting a war powers bill:  
In essence, the Senate bill said the following: The decision to go to war, under 
our Constitution, is a decision for Congress to make. . . .  Fresh from the 
control of King George, they no longer wanted one man, however decent, 
however benign, to make the troublesome and difficult decision to commit the 
United States to war.62 
The Senate had attempted to define three emergency situations that would 
permit the President to act on his own without any prior authority from 
Congress.63  What came out of conference was “a total, complete distortion of 
the war powers concept.”64  Some lawmakers looked to the press to see how 
well they were doing in upholding legislative prerogatives.  Eagleton looked to 
constitutional principles and the language of the bill.  He noted that: 
[T]he media coverage of the bill still says that this limits the President’s war 
powers.  It does not.  The bill gives the President of the United States unilateral 
authority to commit American troops anywhere in the world, under any 
conditions he decides, for 60 to 90 days.  He gets a free 60 days and a self-
executing option for an additional 30 days, making 90.65 
Having watched the performance of Congress on the war powers bill, 
Eagleton said he was “dumbfounded” because for the past five years he had 
been present at all of the resolutions and amendments intended to restrict 
presidential war power and had heard “Senator after Senator decr[y] the fact 
 
 56. Veto of the War Powers Resolution, PUB. PAPERS 893 (Oct. 24, 1973). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. 119 CONG. REC. 36198 (1973). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 36177. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. 119 CONG. REC. 36177 (1973). 
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that a President had got us involved in a nightmare, and that we should not get 
involved in a nightmare again; and that no one man could ever get us involved 
in a nightmare again. . . .”66  He asked how Congress, after a decade of 
watching the Vietnam War divide the country and consume American lives 
and American treasure, could once again give “unbridled, unlimited total 
authority to the President to commit us to war.”67 
It is extraordinary to review Eagleton’s single-minded focus on the content 
and meaning of the war powers bill.  Democratic members of the House and 
Senate relished the thought of overriding a Nixon veto, having come up short 
eight times in a row: “Some of my colleagues will celebrate.  The President has 
beaten us 8 to 0 so far in the veto league, so some of us are eager for our first 
victory.  And so there will be some handshakes and some jubilation.  But what 
a mistake we are about to make.”68  Press accounts and partisan calculations 
never diverted Eagleton from his responsibility to see that the Constitution was 
protected and defended, which was the oath he took as a Senator. 
Javits read Nixon’s veto message as proof that the bill was effective.  
Nixon claimed that the bill “would seriously undermine this nation’s ability to 
act decisively and convincingly in times of international crisis,” by which 
Javits concluded that Nixon thought “his power is very reduced, and drastically 
so.”69  Javits found the veto message “the best evidence as to whether we are 
grant[ing] additional authority to him.”70  Eagleton did not get sidetracked by 
this type of speculation.  He interpreted the Constitution and the bill, not veto 
messages.  Contrary to some of his colleagues who supported the bill and 
believed they had reasserted the role of Congress, he said, “I do not view this 
as a historic recapture; on the contrary I view it as a historic surrender.”71  
After hearing Javits say that “the President will make his calculations and take 
his chances that the 60-day period applies,” Eagleton asked Javits whether he 
thought “this is a game with the President.”72 
The House narrowly overrode Nixon’s veto, voting 284 to 135.73  As in the 
Senate, some members of the House knew that Congress was transferring its 
power to the President.  Others got caught up in partisan calculations that had 
nothing to do with the merits of the legislation.  William Green remarked that 
the bill “has popularly been interpreted as limiting the President’s power to 
engage our troops in a war,” but a careful reading of the legislation convinced 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 36178. 
 69. Id. at 36188. 
 70. 119 CONG. REC. 36188 (1973). 
 71. Id. at 36189. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 36221–22. 
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him that it “is actually an expansion of Presidential warmaking power, rather 
than a limitation.”74  Vernon Thomson held no illusions about the bill: “The 
clear meaning of the words certainly points to a diminution rather than an 
enhancement of the role of Congress in the critical decisions whether the 
country will or will not go to war.”75  Bob Eckhardt condemned the abdication 
of congressional power.76  Ron Dellums, having opposed the House bill and 
the conference version, held firm and voted to sustain the veto: “Richard Nixon 
is not going to be President forever.  Although many people will regard this as 
a victory against the incumbent President, because of his opposition, I am 
convinced that it will actually strengthen the position of future Presidents.”77 
The consistency of Dellums was not matched by some of his colleagues.  
He opposed the House bill and the conference product because he regarded 
them as bad legislation.78  He therefore voted to sustain Nixon’s veto to 
prevent the bill from becoming law.79  Bella Abzug and others voted 
erratically, depending on the politics of the moment.  She voted against the 
House bill and the conference version because they expanded presidential war 
power.80  As she noted during debate on the conference report: “[It] gives the 
President 60 to 90 days to intervene in any crisis situation, on any pretext, 
while Congress merely asks that he tell us what he has done.”81  Yet she 
strongly supported a veto override for reasons that had nothing to do with the 
quality or substance of the bill.  She offered this argument: “This could be a 
turning point in the struggle to control an administration that has run amuck.  It 
could accelerate the demand for the impeachment of the President.”82 
Abzug was not alone in voting with one purpose on the House bill and the 
conference report and adopting a different purpose on the override.  Fifteen 
members of the House voted against the House bill and the conference version 
because they considered the legislation inadequate and unsound.83  To be 
consistent, they should have voted to sustain Nixon’s veto to prevent a bad bill 
 
 74. Id. at 36204. 
 75. 119 CONG. REC. 36207 (1973). 
 76. Id. at 36208. 
 77. Id. at 36220. 
 78. See id. 
 79. Id. at 36222. 
 80. 119 CONG. REC. 36222 (1973). 
 81. Id. at 33870. 
 82. Id. at 36221. 
 83. See id.  The Representatives the author refers to are: Bella Abzug, Robert Drinan, John 
Duncan, John James Flynt, Jr., William Harsha, Ken Hechler, Elizabeth Holtzman, William 
Hungate, Phillip Landrum, Trent Lott, Joseph Maraziti, Dale Milford, William Natcher, Frank 
Stubblefield, and Jamie Whitten. 
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from becoming law.  Yet they switched sides and delivered the decisive votes 
for enactment.84 
CONCLUSION 
Throughout the years of debate on the War Powers Resolution, no member 
of Congress commanded the field like Tom Eagleton.  He developed a 
sophisticated and clear understanding of what the Framers intended and why 
they thought the way they did.  He took that framework of the Constitution, as 
adapted over two centuries by precedent and practice, and proceeded to draft 
legislation that would be faithful to those constitutional values.  Many of his 
colleagues, though initially motivated as he was to redress the imbalance 
between Congress and the President, lacked his clarity of thought and integrity 
of purpose.  They did not measure up to his depth of commitment.  At no time 
did he posture and pretend that the war powers bill, as it came from conference 
committee, represented a reassertion of legislative power because that was how 
the press viewed it.  He did not let his opinion of individuals, such as Richard 
Nixon, weaken his ability to evaluate the substance of legislation.  One Senator 
told him after the override debate: “I heard your argument.  I agree with you.  I 
love the Constitution, but I hate Nixon more.”85  Eagleton did not switch votes, 
as many did, by calculating how it might have short-term partisan or political 
benefits.  He was there for the long term.  He had taken an oath to support and 
defend the Constitution and that dedication provided all the lodestar he ever 
needed.  Blessed by intelligence, he was blessed even more by an inner 
strength that allowed him to see things as they were and to remain steadfast to 
the Constitution. 
 
 
 84. See id. 
 85. EAGLETON, supra note 11, at 220. 
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